This study finds that the agency problems of companies with high free cash flow (FCF) and low growth opportunities induce auditors of companies in the United States to raise audit fees to compensate for the additional effort. We also find that high FCF companies with high growth prospects have higher audit fees. In both cases, higher debt levels moderate the increased fees, consistent with the role of debt as a monitoring mechanism. Other mechanisms to mitigate the agency costs of FCF such as dividend payout and share repurchase (not studied earlier) do not moderate the higher audit fees.
Introduction
This study provides further evidence on whether audit fees vary in relation to the agency problems that can arise in companies with excess free cash flow (FCF) . 1 Our goal is to understand better the mixed evidence in the literature thus far. We test several hypotheses about how FCF and company growth opportunities interact to induce auditors to charge higher audit fees to compensate for the additional risk and effort from FCF agency problems. For example, audit fees should be higher for companies with high FCF and low growth prospects if this encourages managers to invest FCF unwisely and mask such behavior by manipulating the financial statements. Audit fees should also be higher for companies with high FCF and high growth prospects. Unlike companies with low FCF and high growth potential that often issue shares to raise cash for valuable investment projects (Myers and Majluf 1984) , companies with high FCF and high growth prospects can fund growth internally, which attracts less capital market scrutiny. Companies with high FCF and high growth propects also tend to have less debt (Myers 1977, Barclay and Smith 1995) , which reduces debt monitoring and, thus, evinces greater auditor involvement. Because the evidence thus far studies companies in smaller capital markets, where agency problems can be less evident empirically, we conduct our analysis on a sample of large U. S. public companies. Richardson (2006) , for example, argues that overinvestment of FCF can be a serious problem for U. S. traded companies.
Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that the combination of high FCF and low growth prospects encourages managers to engage in non-value-maximizing activities. Some studies examine acquisition 3 have higher audit fees. First, these companies can fund growth opportunities internally and are, thus, less subject to capital market scrutiny, which may require more auditing involvement. Second, these companies can be more difficult to audit when they involve intangible assets and growth options, which potentially increase audit effort and risk. Third, the literature offers empirical evidence (Myers 1977) that high growth companies have lower debt levels to prevent loss from the underinvestment problem, and such relative lack of debt monitoring creates additional monitoring duties for auditors.
Also, the relation between FCF and audit fees has not been tested in the context of a more diverse and complex capital market such as the United States (compared to Australia and Hong Kong),
where agency issues can be more acute, in that companies are typically larger and auditors' responsibilities and liability clearly extend beyond the financial statement audit. 2 Richardson (2006) documents that for non-financial companies in the U. S. during 1988-2002 , the average company overinvests 27 percent of its available FCF. Our first objective is to test the audit fee/FCF relation in the context of U. S. capital markets.
Companies often use debt to monitor (and mitigate) the agency problems of FCF, as this reduces the funds available to managers. However, capital reduction or increased dividend payout are also "good" mechanisms to manage excess cash, although such payouts may be less effective than debt, according to Jensen (1986) . Gul and Tsui (1998) find that debt interacts with high FCF/low growth companies to reduce audit fees, but do not test the effects on audit fees of alternative mechanisms such 2 U. S. auditing standards as promulgated by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) may require a broader auditors' responsibility compared to Australian or Hong Kong auditing standards. For example, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5-An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements (June 12, 2007) , (and its predecessor, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2, 2002) emphasizes the importance of an overall risk assessment in planning the audit, and includes an analysis of "matters affecting the industry in which the company operates, such as financial reporting practices, economic conditions, laws and regulations, and technological changes" and "matters relating to the company's business, including its organization, operating characteristics, and capital structure." (p. 399). While current Australian standards (e.g., ASA 315) are similar to the PCAOB in this regard, ASA 315 became effective only for periods commencing on or after 1 July 2006, which is mostly outside of our study period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) We find that high FCF/low growth companies have higher audit fees, which supports the view that auditors recognize and address the agency problems of FCF, for instance, possible financial statement manipulation. However, unlike Tsui (1998, 2001) and Ferguson and Taylor (2007) , we find that high FCF/high growth companies also have higher audit fees. While this relation could be due to financial statement manipulation, we also surmise that this reflects a lack of transparency of managers' investment behavior regarding positive NPV projects, coupled with an increased complexity in measuring such positive growth projects. Lastly, consistent with Jensen's (1986 Jensen's ( , 1988 debtmonitoring hypothesis, we find that higher debt moderates the agency cost of FCF as reflected in audit 3 Gul and Tsui (1998) and Ferguson and Taylor (2007) test the relation between FCF and audit fees on low growth and high growth companies based on two separate regressions: low FCF/low growth companies with high FCF/low growth companies, and low FCF/high growth companies with high FCF/high growth companies. Our method has the advantage that it allows a comparison of the four groups of companies simultaneously.
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fees. However, we find no evidence that dividend or share repurchase payouts play an equivalent moderating role.
Our paper, therefore, adds to the literature in three ways. First, unlike the previous work, we document that audit fees reflect the agency problems of FCF regardless of whether the company has good or bad growth prospects. Since we use methods similar to the prior work, this finding is best explained by the economic and institutional setting that we examine (U. S. capital markets), where the agency problems of FCF can be more significant for auditors than elsewhere. Indeed, from an audit risk or effort standpoint, it is unclear why we should expect agency costs to be differentially consequential for audit fees in high FCF/low growth versus high FCF/high growth situations, as the previous literature seems to imply. Second, there has been a considerable amount of research that tests the FCF theory on corporate transactions such as takeovers, acquisitions, and R&D investments. The recent availability of U. S. audit fee data provides a timely opportunity to examine the impact of such FCF agency costs in an auditing context. This is particularly useful in that prior work on the effects of FCF on corporate transactions has focused mostly on the U. S. market. Third, we extend the literature by investigating whether other control mechanisms such as dividend payout and share repurchases address the agency problem by helping companies reduce the pool of excess funds available for investment. The main implication of our work is that when high FCF companies create agency costs, shareholders can suffer too, from the cost of increased audit fees, and this seems to occur regardless of whether the FCF agency costs arise in low or high growth situations. Indeed, the additional auditing resources needed to remedy an arguably inefficient use of FCF by managers represents a deadweight cost to investors, and to the economy in general. Economically, we estimate that audit fees are higher by approximately $82,000 for 6 the average high FCF company in our sample.
Section 2 reviews the related literature and outlines the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research methods. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 examines the robustness of the results to alternative procedures and definitions and section 6 concludes. Jensen (1986) contends that FCF creates agency problems because of the increased likelihood of value destroying investments. He also suggests that the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers may be more severe for a company with high FCF and low growth prospects. Many studies have subsequently investigated the implications of FCF for investment and financing activities (Blanchard et al. 1994 , Shin and Stulz 1998 , Harford 1999 , Opler et al. 2001 ; and most support Jensen's hypothesis and confirm that the costly agency problems occur in companies with high FCF and poor investment opportunities.
Literature and Hypotheses

Literature
We consider this hypothesis in an auditing context, specifically, whether audit fees might vary in relation to the agency problems of FCF. One reason is that managers of FCF companies may waste company resources on unwise projects and attempt to mitigate the deterioration of company value by manipulating the financial statements. Jaggi and Gul (2005) and Chung et al. (2005) show that increased audit risk and effort as a result of such manipulation leads to higher audit fees. The subjective nature of accruals alone may induce auditors to increase audit risk and effort and, thus, audit fees (Gul et al. 2003) . The use of accruals may also raise questions about management credibility (Cohen et al. 2002) . Similarly, auditors may recognize the potential for earnings management as an audit risk factor 7 (Bell et al. 2002) .
While high FCF/low growth companies should reflect high agency costs, high FCF/high growth companies may also foster high agency costs and thus warrant additional auditing. For example, the latter companies can fund growth opportunities internally and may be less subject to capital market scrutiny (Myers and Majluf 1984) . High growth companies can also be more difficult to audit. They have a higher ratio of market value (including future investment opportunities) to assets-in-place and, therefore, possess more intangible value, which can be harder to identify, measure, and audit. 4 suggest, opportunistic behavior can be particularly severe in high growth companies when managerial actions are difficult to observe, which can increase audit fees. Also, high FCF/high growth companies tend to have lower levels of debt (Myers 1977, Barclay and Smith 1995) , with the lack of debt monitoring potentially creating additional audit work.
Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis follows from the preceding discussion and tests for an overall effect on audit fees of the agency costs of FCF.
H1. Audit fees for high FCF companies should be higher than low FCF companies' audit fees. Jensen (1986) argues that debt to an optimal level can mitigate the agency problems of FCF by reducing the cash available for discretionary spending. Higher debt, therefore, should serve as a mechanism to reduce auditors' monitoring of FCF, which should reduce audit fees. On the other hand, 8 beyond the optimal level, additional debt could motivate misstatements by management to avoid violations of accounting-based debt covenants and, therefore, the overall effect of higher debt on audit fees is not unidirectional. Tsui (1998, 2001) For companies with high FCF, a dividend increase can reduce current cash that would otherwise be invested in negative NPV projects (Jensen 1986) . Dividends are similar to debt in that they become a commitment once declared (Oded 2008 
Data and Research Design
Data Collection
We first obtain audit fees data for all US publicly listed companies from the Audit Analytics database with fiscal year ends between 2000 and 2006 (79,918 company-year observations). We then obtain 68,313 financial statement observations from Compustat over the same period and match the two data sources using the central index key to yield 45,231 company-year observations. We also collect market data from CRSP. We further eliminate financial and insurance institutions and observations with auditor changes, missing values for proxies of growth, FCF, dividends, share repurchase and other variables, to obtain a final sample of 16,771 company-year observations. 
Proxies for Experimental and Dependent Variables
FCF
We measure FCF as operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, preferred dividends, and ordinary dividends, normalized by either the total book value of equity or assets in the previous year (Lehn and Poulsen 1989) . This measure of FCF, however, ignores capital expenditures or assumes that all capital expenditures are for negative NPV projects. Our FCF measure, therefore, deducts capital expenditures from the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) definition, as their definition could lead to an overestimate of real FCF in that companies classified as high FCF under their approach may actually be low FCF companies with large positive NPV projects.
Growth Opportunities
We use market-to-book assets ratio to proxy for growth opportunities, as research shows that this ratio has the highest information content among four commonly used variables, and is least affected by other factors (Adam and Goyal 2008) . We define the ratio as the market value of equity on the date that companies release their first quarterly report after the year end plus the book value of debt at the year end divided by the book value of assets at the end of year. 
Dividend and Share Repurchases
Similar to others (Allen and Michaely 2003, Grinstein and Michaely 2005), we use dividend yield to proxy for dividend policy, defined as the ratio of the total dividends declared on the common and preferred shares during the year to the market capitalization as per above. Likewise, we use repurchase yield to measure share repurchases, defined as the ratio of common and preferred share repurchases to market capitalization. 7 Also, as many stock repurchases relate to normal debt/equity transactions (e.g., bond redemption), we consider only stock repurchases above a minimum threshold, 11 and define REPURCHASE as a dummy variable that equals one if repurchase yield is in the upper quartile, and zero otherwise. We also drop a small number of observations with negative dividend and repurchase yields.
Audit Fees
Following most audit fee studies, we measure audit fees as the natural log of audit fees paid by the company for audit services during the year (LAF).
Research Design
Univariate Analysis
Our univariate analysis compares LAF for subsamples stratified according to growth opportunities and FCF/TE t-1 . 8 Table 1 reports that median FCF/TE t-1 and growth vary over the sample we calculate median growth for each year and classify companies with growth lower/higher than the median as low/high growth companies. Second, we classify each company as a high or low FCF observation. Third, from steps one and two, we form four groups: low FCF/low growth, low FCF/high growth, high FCF/low growth, and high FCF/high growth. We repeat these three steps each year, obtaining a different median value for growth and FCF/TE t-1 each year, and then combine the quadrants for all six years. Our univariate tests use t-tests to compare two groups at a time to determine the group with the highest log of audit fees. We expect high FCF/low growth and high FCF/high growth companies to have higher audit fees than other companies' fees. 
Multivariate Analysis
Experimental Variables
The experimental variables for the first hypothesis are HLFCF and HLGROWTH, defined as a one for companies with greater than median FCF (HLFCF) and growth opportunities (HLGROWTH) and zero otherwise. 10 We also include two interaction terms HLFCF*SIZE and HLFCF*LOSS to 13 differentiate the risk and effort explanations of the FCF and audit fee relation. 11 We also examine an alternative to this approach by constructing four FCF and growth combined dummy variables, namely FG1, FG2, FG3 and FG4. FG1 has a value of one if it represents low FCF/low growth companies, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we assign FG2 and FG3 a value of one if they represent low FCF/high growth and high FCF/low growth companies, respectively, zero otherwise. The effect of FG4 for high FCF/high growth companies is reflected in the intercept.
Regression Models
We use the following model to test H1. 
Empirical Analysis
Descriptive Analysis
We first compare the industry distribution of the sample with the distribution of companies in the Audit Analytics database (not tabulated). Based on two-digit NAICS categories, the two largest groups in both samples are manufacturing and information industries. The major differences in industry composition between our sample and Audit Analytics sample are a slightly increased percentage in the manufacturing industry, and a decreased percentage in the mining and management industries.
Otherwise, we observe no significant discrepancies between two samples.
Second, table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables in the regressions. For the entire sample, the company data have fairly large ranges in assets, debt to asset ratios, quick ratios, number of segments and the level of audit and non-audit fees. We also observe that Big 4 auditors perform 76 percent of the audits; 39 percent of the observations incurred losses; 50 percent of observations have higher default risk; and 66 percent of the total observations have their audit performed during the busy 15 season (i.e., a December 31 year end date). Compared to low FCF/low growth companies, respectively, high FCF/high growth companies tend to have higher audit and non-audit fees. They are also larger, less likely to be subject to losses and bankruptcy, and less likely to be a utility companies and pay a dividend. However, they are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, be a manufacturing company, and have large share repurchases. We also observe that high FCF/low growth companies have more segments, high leverage ratio, and smaller quick ratio. We also conduct a univariate analysis of the control variables in model 1 by testing whether LAF differs on the basis of size (SIZE), complexity (SEGMENTS), leverage (DA), liquidity (QUICK), and non-audit fees (LNAF). We also partition based on client profitability (LOSS) and default risk (ZSCORE) and audit firm type (BIG4), and busy season (FISCAL). Table 5 shows that mean LAF differs significantly for all partitions. Audit fees are higher for larger, more complex and more risky clients in terms of leverage, default risk, and liquidity. Audit fees are also higher when clients choose a Big 4 auditor, buy more non-audit services, and have their audit work done in the busy season.
Univariate Analysis
Regarding the LOSS variable, while we expected higher audit fees for loss companies similar to default risk, the result shows that loss companies have lower fees (as a univariate comparison). We consider the multivariate analysis next. show that LAF for FG3 is significantly higher than that for FG1 and FG2.
Multivariate Analysis
Hypothesis 1
Overall, these results support the Jensen (1986) hypothesis in an auditing context, namely, that managers of high FCF/low growth companies relative to low FCF companies are more likely to engage in non-value maximizing behavior, possibly including financial statement management, which increases audit fees. We also find higher audit fees for high FCF/high growth companies. Our results further support the view that the higher audit fees from the agency costs of FCF best associate with auditors' fee responses to additional audit effort rather than audit risk.
indicate that high FCF and high risk companies are likely to hold FCF more wisely than high FCF and low risk companies. High FCF companies also likely hold more liquid/marketable assets than other companies, which should make them easier to audit. Both factors could act as offsets to auditors' concerns regarding the negative NPV investments managers that, otherwise, should increase fees. shows a significant and negative coefficient of the HLFCF*DA interaction (-0.048), which implies that for companies with high FCF, mean LAF is lower when FCF is assessed in combination with high debt.
Hypotheses 2-4
As such, this result supports H2. Second, regressions 2 and 3 estimate the audit fee model for low and high growth companies separately. As Jensen (1986) contends, the control function of debt is more important for high FCF companies with low growth opportunities rather than high FCF companies with high growth opportunities. Our results show significant and negative coefficient for HLFCF*DA for both low and high growth companies. Overall, we find that higher debt levels moderate the increased audit fees regardless of the level of companies' growth opportunities. 
Robustness Tests
Partition of Companies' Growth Opportunities
In regression 3 of table 6, we stratified FCF and growth into four subgroups according to high/low FCF and high/low growth partition, and found that growth does not affect the FCF-audit fee relation. As an alternative, we repartitioned the sample into six groups, high/low FCF and three groups of growth opportunities. Companies with growth scores in the bottom and top tercile are classified as low and high growth companies, and companies falling into the middle are categorized as median growth companies. The previous results are robust to this classification.
Lagged FCF and Growth Opportunities Partition
As noted in sub-section 3.2.1, we classified a company with market to book ratio (MTB) lower than the median as a low growth company in that year. We also categorized a company into a low growth group if (1) it has lower than median MTB in both current year t and year t-1; (2) it has lower than median MTB in year t, year t-1 and year t-2; (3) its average growth rate from year t and year t-1 is less than the median average growth; (4) its average growth rate from year t, year t-1 and year t-2 is less than the median average growth. These multi-year proxies have the benefit that they allow sufficient time to assess a company's growth. We also similarly classified high growth, high FCF and low FCF companies using the above methods. The four alternative methods of classifying FCF and growth do not change our results for the FCF, dividend, and share repurchase hypotheses. For the debt hypothesis, however, we find significant negative interactions for companies classified under alternatives (3) and (4), but not under alternatives (1) and (2).
Alternative Measures of FCF
Our results thus far use Lehn and Pouslen's (1989) definition of FCF after deducting capital expenditure to reflect better the existence of cash flow in excess of that required to fund positive NPV investments. We repeat our analyses employing Lehn and Pouslen's proxy without adjustments. We find that the experimental variable HLFCF is not significantly associated with LAF, which is inconsistent with our expectation regarding the Jensen hypothesis. However, this may be due to 22 overestimation of FCF resulting from following Lehn and Poulsen's definition, that is, as noted in subsection 3.2.1, high FCF companies under such definition may exclude companies with actual high levels of FCF. Since capital expenditure can be spent on both positive and negative NPV projects, we further test the sensitivity of our results by assigning some arbitrary thresholds for positive and negative projects. For example, when we assume that 25 percent, 50 percent or 75 percent of the capital expenditure is used for positive NPV projects, and then calculate FCF by subtracting the positive NPV portion, the results are qualitatively unchanged.
Dividend and Share Repurchase Hypotheses
Our earlier findings show only one significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term HLFCF*REPURCHASE. We examined the choice of dividend and share repurchase proxies using two alternative measures: the ratio of dividend (repurchase) to the sum of dividends and repurchases (Desai and Jin 2007) and the ratio of dividend (repurchase) to the earnings before extraordinary items (Blouin and Nondorf 2004, Grullon and Michaely 2004) . Further, as dividends or share repurchases alone may not be sufficient to reduce agency costs of FCF, we also examine whether share repurchases and dividends can complement if not substitute for debt, and help increase total free cash payout. Therefore, we test a series of three and four way interactions. These results support the conclusion that neither dividend nor repurchases significantly moderate the positive relation between FCF and LAF.
We also conduct analysis using four measures of abnormal share repurchase and dividend. The first measure, following Guay and Harford (2000) , creates a dummy variable that has a value of one if the company has a decrease/constant dividend payout in prior year and an increase in dividend payout in current year, or if the increase of company's dividend payout in current year is larger than that in the 23 previous year. The second measure subtracts previous dividend change from the current dividend change. The third measure creates a dummy variable that equals one for dividend increase in the current year and zero otherwise. The last measure constructs a dummy variable that equals one for a dividend increase or stock repurchases and zero otherwise. Overall, irrespective of our proxies for unusual dividend and repurchase changes, our results do not differ.
5.5
Replication of Tsui (1998, 2001) Gul and Tsui (1998) run an OLS regression on companies in the bottom quartile of growth opportunities. They adopt the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) definition of FCF and interact FCF with debt to test the moderating role of debt. They find a significantly positive coefficient for FCF and a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction between FCF and debt. We test our first two hypotheses following the approach of Gul and Tsui (1998) . Our results show insignificant coefficients for FCF and the interaction between FCF and debt using the full sample set. 18 The only case where we are able to replicate their results (on our dataset) for the FCF hypothesis is when we trim the continuous FCF variable by four percent (above and below), or when we use an ordinal FCF variable, coded into a 1-5 scale. However, we still fail to find evidence in support of the debt monitoring hypothesis after we trim or rank the data. A descriptive analysis shows that the observations in the top and bottom four percent differ from the rest of our sample in that they have larger growth value, higher debt level, and are more likely to incur losses and be subject to bankruptcy. It, therefore, appears that, overall, the companies in our sample could be more risky than the Hong Kong or Australia samples used in Gul and Tsui (1998) .
18 When we subtract the capital expenditure from Gul and Tsui's FCF definition, the coefficient for FCF is still insignificant. Gul and Tsui (2001) further introduce the director ownership as a proxy for management ownership into the analysis, and find that the audit fees for companies with high FCF/low growth and high director ownership are lower than for similar companies with low levels of director ownership.
Contrary to their findings, we find that audit fees are higher for companies with high FCF/low growth and high director ownership. Therefore, instead of supporting a convergence of interests effect, as argued by Gul and Tsui (2001) , our results are consistent with the entrenchment argument of management ownership, such that managers with large shareholdings have greater control over the company and, thus, greater scope for acting in their own private interest (Lennox 2005) . However, although we are unable to replicate Gul and Tsui's findings with our data using their approach, our results are largely consistent with their conclusion.
Conclusion
This study tests whether the agency problems of companies with high FCF and low growth prospects induce their auditors to charge higher audit fees relative to other companies' fees. To test the FCF hypothesis from an auditing perspective, we also posit that high FCF/high growth companies should have higher audit fees. We find that audit fees of high FCF/low growth companies and high FCF/high growth companies are significantly higher than those of low FCF/low growth and low FCF/high growth companies, a result that supports the FCF hypothesis, and that such higher fees associate mostly with audit effort, not audit risk. Our results also support the debt-monitoring hypothesis in the context of auditing in that we find that audit fees vary negatively with debt for companies with high FCF. However, our study offers no evidence to suggest that audit fees vary negatively with the interaction of FCF and dividends or share repurchases, two other mechanisms that 25 companies can use to reduce FCF agency costs.
The positive relation between FCF and audit fees documented in this study lends some support to the view that the economic role of auditing has a broader governance contribution, as the FCF problem is only one instance of weak corporate governance. A number of recent studies has addressed this issue and specifically examined the corporate governance role of auditing. For example, Griffin et al. (2008) test an economic framework that explains a countervailing relation between governance and auditing. They find a positive association between governance and audit fees because auditing is one mechanism of governance, and a negative relation because auditors incorporate the benefits of better governance in pricing their services. Choi and Wong (2007) examine whether the strength of a country's legal system affects the governance role of auditors and conclude that auditors do play a strong governance role in countries with weak legal institutions.
Finally, we note that this study explores only a supply-side explanation of the positive relation between the agency problems of FCF and audit fees , that is, when the agency problems of FCF are severe, auditors will expend more effort, which induces higher fees. Future research might consider other explanations for this potential positive relationship. For instance, a positive relation may stem from shareholders' demands for higher quality audits to mitigate the agency problems of FCF. Auditors may also charge higher fees if they know that clients can pay more because of the available excess cash. Future research might also consider possible links between the demand side of auditing and the wider role of auditing as a governance or control mechanism to solve agency problems in general, that is, beyond the specific FCF agency issue that we address here. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 , respectively, 0 otherwise. a. Table 2 states the definitions of these variables. b. REPURCHASE =1 if an observation is in the upper quartile purchase of common and preferred stock divided by market capitalization, otherwise 0. The 25% repurchase yield cut off is 0.0082. c. Tests of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .01. a. The variables are defined in table 2. HLGROWTH=1 if GROWTH is greater than the median, 0 otherwise; HLFCF=1 if FCF/TE t-1 is greater than the median, 0 otherwise; and FG1, FG2, FG3=1 if the variable refers to companies with low FCF/low growth, low FCF/high growth, and high FCF/low growth, respectively, otherwise 0. b. Tests of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .05, * = less than .10, ns = not significant. Tests of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .05, * = less than .10, ns = not significant. c. The results for the control variables for the dividend and repurchase hypotheses are almost identical, and, therefore, we omitted the results for the control variable to save space. We only report the results for the interaction terms (HLFCF*DIVIDEND for the dividend hypothesis and HLFCF*REPURCHASE for the repurchase hypothesis).
